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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RAIN MAKING AND THE LAW*

The advent of recent technological advances in the field of meteorology,
frequently referred to as rain-making or weather control, have propounded
new and interesting problems to the lawyer as well as to the scientist.' It
is clear, from a description of the methods employed in weather control,
that not only will the environment of the social group be affected, but that
the rights of 'individuals are also likely to be concerned. The technique
used most generally, at the present time, is one by which iodide particles
are injected into rain clouds, either by dispersal from aircraft or by sending the same up from the ground in the form of smoke. These dispersed
particles, due to their temperature and mass, hasten the coming of the
point at which the moisture in the clouds normally condenses and falls
as rain or snow. The accelerated precipitation induced thereby then falls
upon the terrain beneath, which land area might not, by reason of the
movement of the clouds, otherwise receive the benefit of such moisture.
It is obvious that rights in land, air 2 and water may be affected by
such activity. Benefits, unquestionably, are to be derived from the new
technique.8 In California, for example, many acres of valuable timber
land were recently saved from forest fire in this way.4 Water-parched
communities in the east have replenished water sources in advance of
normal dates. But there is no doubt that "wrongs" done by these rain
makers will bring problems to the attorney's office for solution and courts
will be faced with the job of making new law.
At present, the attorney faced with a problem concerning rain-making
* This comment summarizes the arguments advanced by a team representing
Chicago-Kent College of Law in the 1950 National Law School Moot Court Competition. The team, consisting of John P. Demling and Russell L. Engber, with
Alan D. Katz and David S. Pochis on the brief, defeated representatives of the
University of Illinois College of Law, the University of Chicago Law School and
the University of Notre Dame School of Law to win the championship both in
Illinois and the area covered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1 See article entitled "Weather Under Control," Fortune Magazine, February, 1948.
2 Rain making activities may have an adverse effect upon the operator of aircraft
although this phase of the problem is not discussed herein. See, for example, Section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act, 11 Unif. Laws Anno., p. 177.
3 The blessings are not always unmixed, even to the rainmakers. Time Magazine,
Vol. LVII, No. 11, p. 54, under date of March 12, 1951, reports the experience of
two California weather consultants who ascended a mountain near Santa Barbara
to fulfill a contract with the city. Their machinery worked too well. When they
were ready to quit for the day they found they were snowbound. Rescue squads
summoned by radio had to bulldoze their way through four-foot drifts for three
days before it was possible to bring the snowmakers down to civilization.
4 New York Times, July 8, 1950, carried a report of the incident.
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will, unfortunately, find little to aid him in the form of reported precedent
bearing directly in point. One decision has served, thus far, to introduce
the problem to the law reports. In the case of Slutsky v. City of New York,"
a hotel resort owner sought to enjoin the city from carrying on its rainmaking activities 6 on the ground that the same were endangering his resort
business. The court, denying relief, stated: "The relief which the plaintiffs ask is opposed to the general welfare and public good; and the dangers
which plaintiffs apprehend are purely speculative. This court will not
protect a possible private injury at the expense of a positive public advantage."7 Because of the superior public interest involved, and because
the plaintiffs had not otherwise shown themselves sufficiently damaged, or
even in danger of being damaged, the case is one of limited value.
Lacking direct precedent upon the point, a pure logical analysis of
the problem may be made in an effort to understand the issues likely to be
raised by weather control as well as to point the way toward their solution.
In much the same way, the existing body of the common law may be examined in order to achieve the same goals. To a limited extent, this note
is directed to that end but in any discussion of pertinent principles of
the common law it will be assumed that the rights involved are private
rather than public, at least to the extent that those concepts may be
disconnected. It will also be assumed that the "wrongs" complained
of have arisen from an individual's relationship to his real property, for
the initial problems in this field will arise when one person, in his successful effort to supply himself and his land with water, has thereby either
deprived another person of that water or has, without that intention, oversupplied the other with it. Again, the problem will be considered primarily
from the point of view involved.
The question first presents itself, upon learning that rain making involves an alteration in both cloud formation and cloud constituency,
whether one may, in any way, lay claim to a legal title to the clouds
themselves so as to be in a position to claim damages, even if nominal,
from the rain maker who has "seeded" the clouds. The layman, it is
submitted, would have little difficulty giving an answer to such a query.
He would say that, clouds being but a part of things natural, only nature,
or the deities, might lay claim to them. The essence of such thinking is
also found in the law. Some things have been said to be the proper subject of private ownership; other things are not." According to Blackstone,
most things are naturally subject to private ownership, but other things,
5 197 Misc. 730, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 238 (1950).

6 The City of New York was, at the time, suffering from a severe water shortage:
New York Times, August 18, 1950, p. 23.
7 197 Misc. 730, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 238 at 240.
8 Just. Inst., Lib. 2, Tit. 1.
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at least while in their natural state, are not. These latter, he has said,
must be reduced to possession before they may be classified as being subject
to private ownership. Among such things, he has categorized light, air,
water, and animals ferae naturae.9 Upon this ground, it may be said that
clouds, in their natural state, are not the proper subject of private ownership, hence one may not claim injury to his property in the clouds themselves for he has no such property. But what of the rain maker? May
he be said to act so as to reduce the clouds to his possession? Beside the
extreme burden of proving such a possession, it would seem that one can
never be said to possess that which he cannot contain, either as fish are
caught in a net or as land is circumscribed by a boundary. It is submitted, then, that one may not be said to possess clouds, as that term is
used in the common law, they being of such vague and fugitive nature
as to remain among those things which can never be subjected to private
ownership.
Denying that one might claim legal title to the clouds as such, does it
follow that the individual may not claim a beneficial interest in the use
of the clouds? The common law theory of natural rights derived from
one's ownership of land is not limited merely to the right to exclusive
occupancy of the surface. It embraces many aspects of property rights,
often designated by special names, such as the right to enjoyment, to
lateral support, to riparian rights, and others. May ownership not also
encompass another natural right to the uninterrupted fall of rain thereon?
It is possible that analogy may be found in the law respecting water rights
which may indicate the extent to which one may enjoy rights to the fall
of rain. The fact that clouds are essentially nothing more than floating
bodies of tiny droplets of water causes the mind to look first to the latter
possibility.
The law concerning natural watercourses, a portion of the law of
water, defines a natural watercourse as a body of water which flows in
a known and defined channel. 10 Generally speaking, if land touches upon
such a watercourse, the owner thereof is called a riparian owner and, as
such, is entitled to certain benefits in the water supply." He may use
the stream flowing past his land for "domestic" or agricultural purposes,
but may not, according to the common law, divert the water for other pur9 B1. Com., Vol. 1, Book 2, *14. The theory of ownership of even tangible personalty, at common law, involved occupancy as an element: 2 Co. Litt., § 416. See
also Holmes, The Common Law, p. 216. An example of this element of occupancy,
at least as to the ownership of animals ferae naturae, may be found in Pierson v.
Post, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805).
10 Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. v. Pound, 220 Mich. 475, 190 N. W. 248 (1922). See
also Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States (Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, 1911), 3d Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 333 and 380; Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. 1, § 297.
11 Kinyon, "What Can a Riparian Proprietor Do?", 21 Minn. L. Rev. 512 (1937).
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poses nor pollute the same. 1 2 The basis of such a rule lies in the fact
that the owner of land situate upon a watercourse is said to have a
"natural" right, from his favored position adjacent thereto, to the use
of the water as a concomitant to his use of the land. In addition, he
is said to have a right to have the stream flow along its natural course
at its natural rate.'" This common law view has been expanded into the
"reasonable user" rule, which doctrine contemplates that he will make
no more than a reasonable use of the riparian stream so as to allow others
to enjoy its benefits. 4 One attempting to find analogy in this body of law
to the situation here considered, may find substantiation to a large degree
in the exercise of common sense.
A farmer who owns land considers himself as owning more than the
mineral and carbon compounds of the soil itself. He considers the adjacent stream a necessary element to the beneficial use of that soil. It may
well be said that rain is no less a necessary element. To deprive him of
the rain that would ordinarily fall on his land is to injure him; to aid
him by causing the proper amount of rain to be deposited on his soil
benefits him. The artificial rain-maker may act so as to produce either
result. But is the similarity of situation one of sufficient degree to warrant the application of the law of natural watercourses to the art of rain
making? It should be remembered that that body of law grew out of
the idea that watercourses follow defined channels; that they flow with
sufficient constancy as to enable the taking of a measurement of the
degree of interference with their natural states.
Clouds seldom flow,
over a period of time and over a single parcel of land, at anything near so
constant a form or at so constant a rate. They are vague and wandering
things; now here, now gone. This factual difference should cause the
attempted analogy to fail, for the mind would have little trouble distinguishing between the .two factual situations.
There exists, however, in addition to the common law views concerning rights in natural watercourses, another view known as the doctrine
of prior appropriation. This doctrine, followed in many of the western
states," treats water as belonging to all people in common 16 but permits
one to acquire preferential rights in the water if he can (1) show an intent
to apply the water to some beneficial use; (2) demonstrates that he has
Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903).
Taylor v. Rudy, 99 Ark. 128, 137 S. W. 574 (1911) : Druley v. Adams, 102 Il.
177 (1882) : Lawrence v. Whitney, 115 N. Y. 410, 22 N. E. 174 (1889).
14 Southern California Investment Co. v. Wilshire, 144 Cal. 68, 77 P. 767 (1904):
Smith v. Corbit, 116 Cal. 587, 48 P. 725 (1897) ; Garwood v. New York Cent. & II.
Ry. Co., 83 N. T. 400, 38 Am. Rep. 452 (1881).
15 Wiel, "'Priority' in Western Water Law," 18 Yale L. J. 189 (1909).
16 Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P. (2d) 648
(1937).
12

'3
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made a diversion thereof from the natural channel, as by a canal; and (3)
has made an application of the water, within a reasonable time, to some
useful industry. 17 Under this view, if one has met the requirements in
order to be a prior appropriater, he may appropriate the entire stream.'"
Now, what of the rain maker? May he be said to be a prior appropriater?
It would seem not. He may have intended to appropriate the water in
the clouds, may wish to make an appropriation thereof for some useful
purpose, but he could hardly be said to have diverted the "natural
stream" of moisture from its course, as by some canal or conduit. He has
no control over the rain after it begins to fall. He hopes that the force of
gravity, and the wind, will cause "his" rain to fall where he desires it,
but there is no assurance that it will do so."9
Having thus seen that the law as to natural water courses provides a
seeming, but nevertheless inexact, analogy to the problem of weather control, one should consider whether some other aspect of water law provides
a better analogy. If clouds are vague and wandering things, not apt
to travel in well-defined courses, may the law as to percolating waters be
of help? Waters of that character move beneath the surface of the earth
but are not confined to any known and well defined channel. 2° To that
extent, they possess characteristics similar to those of clouds and, unlike
the waters flowing along natural watercourses or underground streams,
they also possess the characteristic of not being readily accessible for the
purpose of measurement either as to quantity or rate of flow. If land be
likened to air space, and percolating water within the land considered
to be like the moisture within the clouds, a rather persuasive analogy
begins to appear. Now what would be the result if the law of percolating
waters were to be applied to the activities of the rain-maker?
In the first place, two distinct views exist as to the right to claim enjoyment of percolating waters. The common law rule treats such percolating waters as being at the absolute disposal of the owner of the land
where the same may be found. According to that rule, the land owner
17 McDonald v. Bear River Min. Co., 13 Cal. 233 (1859); State ex rel. Crowley
v. District Court, 108 Mont. 89, 88 P. (2d) 23 (1939) ; Tammer v. Provo Reservoir
Co., 99 Utah 139, 98 P. (2d) 695 (1940).
18 Hammon v. Rose, 11 Colo. 524, 19 P. 466 (1888) ; Boltar v. Garrett, 44 Ore. 304,
75 P. 142 (1904).
19 It is precisely this lack of control over the fall of rain water which may lead
to the institution of tort actions. An extremely effective job of rain making may
cause the inundation of land owned by one who has not bargained with the rain
maker for any rain at all and who may resent the damage so caused. The case of
Slutsky v. City of New York, 197 Misc. 730, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 238 (1950), may have
reached a different result if the resort proprietor had been able to show a real
injury to his seasonal prospects from too much rain making in his area.
20 Barclay v. Abraham, 21 Iowa 619, 96 N. W. 1080 (1903); Williams v. Ladew,
161 Pa. 283, 29 A. 54 (1894) ; Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keil, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719
(1902-).
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would not be liable, in damages, if his taking of the water prevents, or
injures, others in their use of the percolating waters. 2 1

Most

courts in

this country, however, have followed a doctrine described as the "reasonable user" rule, 22 one which limits the right to take percolating water to
the extent that the taking thereof is necessary for some useful purpose
23
having a relation to the land from within which the water is taken.
Either aspect of the rule could possess usefulness in the rain making situation. For example, one who seeks to cause rain clouds to condense over
his land could claim, under the common law doctrine, that he had an
absolute right to appropriate the water if he could extract it from the
clouds. The other, injured by being deprived of his prospective rain,
might complain under the "reasonable user" doctrine. The outcome
would, of course, depend on the court's acceptance of the analogy and
also, assuming proof to be possible, on the particular version of the
doctrine followed in the jurisdiction. It is submitted, however, that
the analogy between percolating waters and waters present in rain clouds
has some persuasion in reason. There is value also in the fact that the
law relating to percolating waters provides a substantial and well-known
body of precedent ready for application in suit based upon the use or
deprivation of rain water.
There is the further possibility that the law relating to surface waters
may also be applied, by analogy, to the problem at hand. Waters of
that kind, as the name implies, exist on the face of the earth but not
contained in defined streams, channels, or basins, and the nature thereof
is such that the landowner may make use thereof absolutely. 24 Particularly
pertinent may be that portion of the law relating to the obstruction of
surface waters. In that regard, three general rules have been developed.
One such rule, evolved at common law, holds that a landowner may, at
will, prevent surface waters from coming onto his land. 25
In contrast,
the civil law rule declares that all land is under a servitude to receive the
21 Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859) ; Acton v.
Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843) ; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn.
533, 52 Am. Dec. 352 (1850) ; Braidburn Realty Corp. v. East Orange, 107 N. J. L.
291, 153 A. 714 (1931).
22 See, for example, O'Leary v. Herbert, 5 Cal. (2d) 416, 55 P. (2d) 834 (1936)
Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909) ; Forbell v. New
York, 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644 (1900).
23 Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862) ; Dunbar
v. Sweeney, 230 N. Y. 609, 130 N. E. 913 (1921). As to an additional "correlative
rights" doctrine, see Snake Creek Min. & Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irrigation Co., 260
U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed. 423 (1923).
24 Motil v. Boyd, 115 Tex. 82, 286 S. W. 458 (1926).
See also Restatement, Torts,
Vol. 4, § 846; 56 Am. Jur., Water, § 65; and Kinyon & McClure, "Interference with

Surface Waters," 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891 (1940).
25 Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41, 112 S. W. 173 (1908) ; Bates v. Smith, 100 Mass. 181
(1868).
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flow of surface water.2 6 There is a third view, seemingly a minority one,
which uses the test of reasonableness of conduct."
While these rules may
be of little value in determining the right of the rain-maker to remove
moisture from the clouds, they may be helpful in determining his liability,
if any, to adjacent landowners upon whose land the excess waters may be
cast. The particular rule to be urged, on the basis of analogy, will, of
course, depend upon the given facts and the interest sought to be advanced
or protected.
It is not possible to leave the subject without making some reference
to the law relating to oil and gas, a body of principles which, at least in
the early stages of its development in this country, sprang to a large degree
from analogy to common law principles. It may be remembered that a
landowner may appropriate all the oil and gas which he can reduce to his
possession, even though, by so doing, he may exhaust the supply beneath
his neighbor's land, for oil and gas are of fugacious nature. The only
qualification that has been expressed to that doctrine, except for statutory
regulation, has been based on the idea that the landowner may not wastefully or unnecessarily injure the common reservoir of oil or gas.2 8 Decisions respecting oil and gas may have utility, but cases concerning percolating and surface waters should prove more useful. Since they have
to do with water, they should possess an inherent psychological effect
which might not be gained from the use of cases concerning other fluids or
gases.
To this point, the problem has been considered as one arising between
individuals. History records that nations have collapsed, entire civilizations have been blotted out, for lack of rainfall or access to water. It is
easy to see, therefore, that the public at large has an interest in the supply
of rain. Since the public interest may be involved, there is just reason for
application of the principle of sovereignty reflected in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Rain-making activities, from their very nature,
take effect beyond the land boundaries of but a few persons; in fact, may
well extend beyond the boundaries of a state. Interstate compacts over
the use of waters in certain transcontinental rivers are not unknown, so it
well may be that the art of rain-making presents a field ripe for legislature
regulation. Of necessity, that regulation should be by the federal government to avoid internicine conflict. No attempt will be made to discuss
constitutional and policy questions inherent in such a proposal. It is only
submitted that, if put to the test, the common law may furnish a working
26 Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869) ; West v. Taylor, 16 Ore. 165, 13 P. 665
(1888).
27 Swett v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870).
28 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed., 729 (1900);
Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665, 15 S. Ct. 245, 39 L. Ed. 304 (1894).
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basis for the solution of problems which could arise out of litigation
between private parties; but, due to the far-reaching effect which weather
control may have on the nation, the common law will probably fall short
of furnishing a solution for all of the conceivable situations which might
arise.

2

9
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29 For other discussions on the subject, see Brooks, "Legal Aspects of Rainmaking," 37 Cal. L. R. 114 (1949) ; Ball, "Shaping the Law of Weather Control,"
58 Yale L. J. 213 (1949) ; and notes in 1 Stan. L. Rev. 43 and 508.

